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F OR over 15 years, the United States Supreme Court has struggled todefine the constitutional constraints upon a ubiquitous practice in
contemporary American criminal justice: the exercise of factfinding authority by
sentencing judges in the course of determining the specific punishment to be
imposed upon an individual convicted of a criminal offense. While the Court has
permitted much sentencing factfinding to continue unabated, its decisions have
identified certain scenarios in which an offender's constitutional rights are
violated when a fact found at sentencing creates particular impacts on the
punishment. Unfortunately, from the beginning this new constitutional doctrine
in criminal procedure has been fraught with instability, unpredictability, and
analytical incoherence.
The 1999 statutory interpretation decision in Nathaniel Jones v. United
States marked the first time a majority opinion overturned a sentence based upon
the principles that grew into the constitutional law of sentencing factfinding.'
The next year, the much more well-known decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey
invalidated a sentence as a matter of constitutional law.2 In the following decade
and a half, the Court issued over a dozen decisions applying and interpreting,
contracting or expanding, and generally attempting to clarify the scope of the
constitutional rule.3 Although the Court has described the doctrine as originating
* Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law.
1. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999). The Court invoked the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance as one ground for interpreting the statute to define three separate offenses,
rather than a single offense with three separate penalty ranges. See id. See also Benjamin J.
Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not Prove: Jones v. United States and the
Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors Rather than Elements of the
Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 249, 257-58 (1998) (discussing early cases in the doctrine's
development).
2. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000). See generally Benjamin J.
Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L,
REv. 281 (2001) [hereinafter Priester, Constitutional Formalism].
3. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133. S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Cunningham v. California, 549
U.S. 270 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004).
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in the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, its reasoning on that basis is dubious,
and no small effort is required in trying to make sense of the doctrinal analysis.5
As a consequence of this conceptual weakness, the Court's analysis and results in
the Apprendi line of cases have been plagued by inconsistencies and flaws,
perverse unintended consequences, and more.6 In 2014, the doctrine's continuing
incoherence was illustrated in Joseph Jones v. United States, a case in which an
opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari highlighted the ongoing
controversies over the doctrine's proper scope. From Jones to Jones, the Court
has been unable to bring stability and consistency to the constitutional law of
sentencing factfinding.
II. BACKGROUND: SENTENCING FACTFINDING AND THE SUPREME COURT
At the most basic level, the foundational requirements of criminal liability
link the imposition of a sentence to a criminal conviction. Before criminal
punishment may be imposed, therefore, the defendant must be convicted of a
criminal offense. The Constitution requires that all elements of the criminal
offense must be alleged in a procedurally proper charging document and then
proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial or admitted in a guilty plea;
except for petty offenses, the defendant also has a right to trial by jury.8 Once a
conviction on one or more charged offenses has been entered, the sentence
imposed must conform to the authorized punishment for that offense.9 Although
sometimes the law demands a precise, immovable penalty for a particular
offense, the great majority of crimes authorize a range of possible penalties from
which any given offender's sentence will be selected.10 The determination of this
exact, specific sentence for each individual offender may consider additional
sentencing facts-such as the individual's prior criminal history, the gravity or
insignificance of the particular incident compared to other instances of the same
crime, or mitigating criteria which support a merciful penalty-which are not
4. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of
Conviction, and the Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 866 (2004) [hereinafter
Priester, Structuring Sentencing].
5. See Benjamin J. Priester, The Canine Metaphor and the Future of Sentencing Reform:
Dogs, Tails, and the Constitutional Law of Wagging, 60 SMU L. REV. 209, 211-12 (2007)
[hereinafter Priester, Canine Metaphor].
6. See Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: "Policy Nullification"
and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1, 4-5 (2011) [hereinafter Priester, Bizarro World].
7. See Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8, 8-9 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
8. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77 & n.3; Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note
4, at 868. Jury trials are not required for petty offenses, defined as crimes for which a sentence of
less than six months' imprisonment is authorized. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73
(1970).
9. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481-82 & n.9; United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447
(1972); Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 869; KATE STITH & JOst A. CABRANES,
FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 170-71 (1998).
10. See generally Priester, Constitutional Formalism, supra note 2.
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themselves constituent elements of the offense of conviction required to establish
liability but which have relevance to the decision-maker's judgment about the
extent of the appropriate punishment in the particular case."
In the face of the complexity of contemporary U.S. criminal law, however,
these uncontroversial principles are not as simple as they might sound. Which
provisions of law, statutory or otherwise, define the authorized punishment for an
offense? When does factfinding about punishment produce a sentence that
breaches those authorized limits? Which facts relevant to the defendant's
sentence must be charged in the indictment or information and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury, and which may be found by the judge by a lesser
standard of proof while determining the sentence?
Until recent decades, the line between offense elements and sentencing
facts had been considered obvious and easily monitored.12 This was true because
most U.S. jurisdictions had conducted sentencing through essentially unregulated
judicial discretion to select the individual's punishment.'3  In this sort of
sentencing regime, for example, the offender might face up to 20 years'
imprisonment for a bank robbery conviction,14 and the judge has the power to
choose any sentence available. In exercising that authority, the judge might
consider verdict facts, such as the fact that the defendant robbed a bank rather
than a liquor store or an individual person, as well as extraverdict facts, such as
the amount of money stolen, whether a firearm or other weapon was used, or
whether the defendant expressed remorse for his crime.15 In addition, the judge
also would decide the punishment weight assigned to these facts-i.e., how much
to reduce the sentence to account for the defendant's acceptance of responsibility
or how much to increase the sentence because a bystander was injured during the
robbery.'6 Finally, the judge might also consider less quantifiable criteria, such
as a moral judgment about the severity of the offense or the individual's
culpability, as well as a normative assessment of the individual's prospects for
rehabilitation. In the frequently cited case of Williams v. New York, for
instance, the sentencing judge took into account evidence of numerous uncharged
burglaries and the defendant's bad moral character in rendering a decision that he
could not be rehabilitated and, therefore, should receive a death sentence, rather
than life imprisonment, for his first-degree murder conviction.'8  Ultimately,
11. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 234-52.
12. See, e.g., Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 869.
13. See, e.g., id.; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 9, at 9. See also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 363 (1988).
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012).
15. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 7-8 (defining verdict facts and extraverdict
facts).
16. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 227, 252-59 (emphasizing the
distinction between finding existence of facts and determining punishment weight of those facts
and considering implications of the distinction for constitutional law of sentencing factfinding).
17. Id. at 226-27.
18. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949). The Court found that the extraverdict
factfinding used to support the death sentence did not violate the Due Process Clause. See id. at
250-51. Williams is cited in many of the Apprendi cases. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
Winter 2016] 415
UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
sentencing in this regime prioritized judicial discretion to impose individualized
punishment based on a judgment by the trial court judge who interacted with the
defendant directly.' 9
The contemporary sentencing reform movement sought to bring
consistency, regularity, and predictability to the process of determining an
individual's punishment.2 0 Different jurisdictions adopted sentencing reforms in
a wide variety of types, such as single statutes imposing a mandatory minimum
punishment for particular crimes on specific facts, relatively simple advisory
guidelines, or the fully elaborate complexity of the mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.2 1 The common thread among these reforms, though, was
the same basic goal of reducing disparity across defendants in the system so that
like cases were treated alike regardless of the identity, values, or politics of the
particular-often randomly assigned-presiding judge.2 2 Instead of letting each
judge decide what facts to find or ignore, provisions of law for regulating the
exercise of sentencing authority would specify in advance which facts should or
should not be considered at sentencing. Likewise, the weight assigned to facts
also could be specified: no longer might one judge increase a sentence by 10
years for possessing a gun during a robbery while a different judge might
increase only two years; or one judge may give a substantial reduction for
acceptance of responsibility while another gives only a sparse mitigation. Thus,
the sentencing reforms adopted over the last 30 to 40 years have prioritized
systemic uniformity of all sentencing across the full span of offenders based on
policy judgments by decision-makers with a big-picture perspective.23
One crucial consequence of the changes made by the sentencing reform
movement was a significant blurring of the line between offense elements and
sentencing facts. The trial jury might determine a handful of verdict facts to
enter the conviction, while the sentencing judge finds dozens of extraverdict facts
U.S. 466, 481-82 (2000); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 487-88 (2011); id. at 509-10
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 517 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Alleyne v.
United States, 133. S. Ct. 2151, 2169-70 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 235-37, 266-68; STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 9, at 28-29.
20. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 869-70; STITH & CABRANES, supra
note 9, at 104-06. See also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366; Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 6
n.17 (citing sources analyzing goals and outcomes of the sentencing reform movement).
21. See, e.g., Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 870-71; Steven L. Chanenson,
The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 409-22 (2005) (describing numerous
forms of contemporary sentencing regimes).
22. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 237-38, 241-51, 266-69. See also
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 9, at 126-30 (explaining that the predominant narrative of
sentencing reform advocates, which focuses on disparity caused by the exercise of discretion by
sentencing judges, has not given sufficient recognition to equally significant disparities caused by
exercises of discretion or authority by numerous other actors in the criminal justice system).
23. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 237-38, 241-51, 266-69 (explaining
how the Court's decisions have ratified prioritization of system uniformity over individualized
punishment); STITH & CABRANES, supra note 9, at 78-106 (explaining how implementation of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines compelled sentencing judges to focus on application of provisions




by a much lower burden of proof, and the extent of the defendant's actual
sentence is determined almost exclusively by the latter. A federal offender
convicted of possessing with intent to distribute an amount between 0.5 to 5
kilograms of cocaine, for example, would face a statutory punishment range of 5
to 40 years' imprisonment based on the small number of verdict facts needed to
establish the drugs possessed and the required specific intent mens rea.24 Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, numerous additional facts would be found in
the course of determining whether to impose 75 months or 475 months as the
individual's sentence.25 With such a massive swing in fate dependent on
extraverdict facts found by the sentencing judge, it may be little consolation to
the defendant to remind him or her that the verdict facts were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
It is in this historical context, then, that the U.S. Supreme Court had to
confront the newly developed legal regime for criminal sentencing and determine
the constitutional ramifications, if any, these previously unseen sentencing
provisions created. The Court's path in shaping the constitutional law of
sentencing factfinding has been anything but smooth, and it remains unstable to
this day.
The constitutional implications arose quickly in the Court's decisions. In a
pair of 1998 dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia argued that the defendants'
sentences had been unconstitutionally lengthened beyond the maximum
authorized by the offense of the conviction.26 The following year, in Nathaniel
Jones, a majority of the Court invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
interpret a three-tiered federal criminal statute as creating three separate offenses,
requiring, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the aggravating facts for the
higher tiers be proven as offense elements.27 In 2000, the Court in Apprendi
reached the constitutional question directly and adopted what is often called the
Apprendi rule: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" is an offense
element which "must be submitted to a jury[] and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."28 In the Court's opinions, the rationale for the rule is grounded in the
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012).
25. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2014).
26. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 740-41 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 & n.I1 (1999).
28. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The scholarly response to Apprendi
was immediate and extensive. See, e.g., Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 864 n.7,
869 n.33, 871 n.45; Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 215 n.18. Although recent
decisions, such as Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013), have omitted the
reference to the prior-conviction clause when stating the rule, doctrinally the recidivism exception
remains part of the Apprendi rule. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 8 n.23; Priester,
Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 213 & n.8; Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at
876-78. For an analysis of the exception after Alleyne, see Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior
Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 67 SMU L.
REV. 577, 578-79 (2014); Nancy J. King, Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future,
and the End of the Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REv. 523, 550-51 (2013);
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Sixth Amendment right to jury trial: the Court's argument reasons that criminal
punishment must be constrained to the limits imposed by the offense of
conviction found by the jury or admitted in a guilty plea that waives the jury trial
right, such that extraverdict factfinding may not lead to the imposition of a
sentence more severe than the penalty authorized by the verdict facts.2 9
Subsequent cases rapidly developed the ramifications of the Apprendi rule,
further elaborating on what constitutes the prescribed statutory maximum for
purposes of the rule. In Ring v. Arizona, the Court mandated that juries find the
aggravating factors necessary to justify imposition of a death sentence for capital
murder,3 0 and Cunningham v. California required a similar result for the
aggravating facts triggering an extended-term sentence for a child sex offense.3 ,
The decision in Southern Union Co. v. United States clarified that the rule applies
to the calculation of criminal fines, as well as to the determination of the length
of incarceration.32 On the other hand, Oregon v. Ice distinguished the decision to
impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences for multiple convictions
within a single case, allowing such factfinding to be made by the sentencing
judge.3 3 Finally, the Court has changed course in applying the rule to mandatory
minimum sentences, rather than increases to the maximum sentence. In 2002,
Harris v. United States held, in a split plurality decision, that Apprendi principles
did not require mandatory minimum sentences to be triggered by offense
elements.34 In Alleyne v. United States, in 2013, the Court overruled Harris and
held, in another split decision, that Apprendi applies to factfinding that mandates
both the high and low end of the authorized sentencing range.
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Apprendi line of cases on criminal justice
systems across the country, however, was felt when the Court ruled in Blakely v.
Washington in 2004 and United States v. Booker in 2005 that mandatory
Meg E. Sawyer, Note, The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining the Continuing Vitality of
Almendarez-Torres under Alleyne, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 409, 448-49 (2015).
29. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 213-14; Priester, Structuring
Sentencing, supra note 4, at 873. See also, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162.
30. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
31. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 293 (2007).
32. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012).
33. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 163-64 (2009).
34. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002).
35. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163.
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sentencing guidelines regimes fall within the scope of the Apprendi rule.3 6 In
response to Blakely, many states were forced to revisit their sentencing regimes.37
The Court itself crafted the federal system's response to Booker going
forward, determining that the previously mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines would be implemented on an advisory basis by sentencing judges,
with sentences reviewed on appeal only for reasonableness rather than strict
adherence to the Guidelines.38 In 2007, the Court's decision in Rita v. United
States provided further clarification on how the advisory Guidelines would be
applied at sentencing by trial courts and how sentences would be reviewed for
reasonableness on appeal. Soon thereafter, in Gall v. United States, the Court
upheld as reasonable a sentence that was significantly lower than the Guidelines
would have permitted.4 0 On the same day, Kimbrough v. United States validated
the authority of sentencing judges to reject the severe crack cocaine sentences
produced by the Guidelines,41 and in 2011, Pepper v. United States ratified a
sentencing judge's consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation by the offender
as a mitigating factor supporting a merciful sentence, which was impermissible
under the Guidelines.42 In 2013, a slim majority of the Court concluded in Peugh
v. United States that although the post-Booker Guidelines are sufficiently
advisory to avoid violations of the Apprendi rule, their influence upon sentencing
36. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300-01 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 245 (2005). The scholarly reaction to Blakely and Booker was even greater than to
Apprendi and continues to this day. E.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 216 n.29, 217
n.33; Melissa Hamilton, McSentencing: Mass Federal Sentencing and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2199, 2207-08 (2014); Melissa Hamilton, Sentenciing
Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy Nullification, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 375,
376-78 (2014); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1274-75 (2014); Note, More
than a Formality: The Case for Meaningful Substantive Reasonableness Review, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 951, 954-56 (2014).
37. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 248-49 & nn.179-180 (citing sources
describing states' responses to Blakely). The decision in Alleyne has required some states to adjust
their sentencing practices as well. See, e.g., State v. Roeder, 336 P.3d 831, 857-59 (Kan. 2014)
(reversing mandatory minimum 50-year sentence for murder triggered by finding of several
extraverdict aggravating facts, due to Alleyne violation); State v. Lizardi, 323 P.3d 1152, 1156-57
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that mandatory minimum sentence was imposed in violation of
Alleyne but affirming sentence as harmless error); State v. Grate, 106 A.3d 466, 475-77 (N.J. 2015)
(vacating mandatory minimum sentence imposed based on extraverdict factfinding as Alleyne
violation); Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247, 257 (Pa. 2015) (ruling that the statute
imposing mandatory minimum sentence for narcotics possession near a school is unconstitutional
under Alleyne). But see, e.g., People v. Herron, 845 N.W.2d 533, 537-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013)
(concluding that Michigan sentencing guidelines did not impose mandatory minimum sentence in
violation of Alleyne).
38. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-61.
39. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007). See also Nelson v. United States, 555
U.S. 350, 352 (2009) (per curiam).
40. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
41. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007). See also Spears v. United States,
555 U.S. 261, 263 (2009) (per curiam).
42. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011).
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judges is sufficiently impactful to prohibit retroactive application of Guidelines'
amendments, which impose higher punishments.4 3
Many of the key decisions in the Apprendi line of cases were decided by
narrow majorities, often with support from concurring opinions offering
alternative perspectives on the scope of the rule. The continued disagreement
within the Court, on both the scope of the Apprendi rule and the terms of Booker-
Rita reasonableness review, is evidenced by Justice Scalia's opinion in Joseph
Jones, which insists that the current implementation of Booker and Rita is
inadequate to prevent violations of the Apprendi rule.4 4  The Court's
development of the constitutional law of sentencing factfinding likely is far from
concluded.
III. WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE?
The Court's development of a constitutional law of sentencing factfinding
is premised on the fundamental idea that the establishment of an offense of
conviction necessarily imposes limits on the punishment which may be imposed
on the convicted offender. Extraverdict facts proven at sentencing may be used
in determining the individual's specific penalty, but they may not produce a
sentence which supersedes the constraints generated by the verdict facts. Thus,
the key function of the Court's doctrine in the Apprendi line of cases is to
mandate which facts must, as a matter of constitutional law, be established as
offense elements.
A. Statutory Offense Elements: Crime Definitions
When a single statutory section defines a single crime and provides the
scope of its available punishment, no constitutional controversy arises. The
Court has not had to confront a situation in which, for example, a defendant was
convicted of one count of misdemeanor simple robbery but sentenced to a jail
term only available for felony armed robbery-i.e., more than a year's
imprisonment. Such a sentence would be so plainly ultra vires that presumably
no prosecutor or judge would misapply this kind of straightforward statutory
regime and try to impose it, nor would it escape swift summary reversal on
appeal if it somehow occurred.
The reality of contemporary U.S. criminal codes, though, bears little
resemblance to an idealized simple model of single sections with clear
punishments. Compound statutes created one context for the Court's struggle to
define the constitutional boundaries between offense elements and sentencing
facts.
43. See Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2078 (2013). The dissenting justices
maintained that the advisory Guidelines have no legal force at all and, therefore, cannot implicate
the prohibitions contained in the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 2089 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. See Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8, 8-9 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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For multi-tiered compound statutes, at least, the Court crafted a clean
solution. In Nathaniel Jones, the statute contained escalating maximum
penalties: up to 15 years for basic carjacking, up to 25 years if serious bodily
injury resulted, and up to life imprisonment if death resulted.45 The Court held
that a sentence beyond 15 years could be imposed only if the fact of serious
46bodily injury was established as an element. In Harris and Alleyne, the statute
included escalating mandatory minimum penalties for the presence of a firearm
in connection with a narcotics offense: 5 years for possessing, 7 years for
brandishing, and 10 years for discharging.47 In Alleyne, the Court held that the
fact of brandishing was an offense element when it led to the 7-year
punishment.48 Other statutes define tiered penalties, such as the principal federal
narcotics offense's penalties tied to drug quantity: up to 20 years, 5 to 40 years,
and 10 years to life. 4 9 After Alleyne, the facts triggering a higher tier must be
offense elements to the extent they raise either the minimum or maximum
penalty.50
The Court applied the same requirement to a variety of other compound
offense-defining statutes as well. In Apprendi, the state statutory regime defined
a weapons offense in one section and provided the penalties in a separate
section.5 1  The weapons offense carried a base sentence of 5 to 10 years'
imprisonment, which could be enhanced to 10 to 20 years if the sentencing judge
found by a preponderance of the evidence that, among other criteria, the offense
was a hate crime.52 The Court held that the 12-year sentence imposed on
Apprendi was unconstitutional because the hate crime finding had not been
established as a verdict fact.53 In Cunningham, the state statute provided three
precise punishments for a child sex offense-6, 12, or 16 years' imprisonment-
and authorized the sentencing judge to find aggravating facts to justify the upper-
term sentence.54 Again, the Court held that the 16-year sentence could not be
imposed based on extraverdict factfinding rather than verdict facts.55 In Southern
Union, the federal statute provided for "a fine of not more than $50,000 for each
45. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 21 19(1)-(3)
(2012)).
46. See id. at 231, 251-52.
47. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2013) (applying 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012)). See also Harris v. United States, 536 U.S 545, 550-51 (2002)
(same).
48. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163-64.
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
50. Findings of fact which do not alter either the maximum or the minimum penalty, however,
may continue to be proven as extraverdict facts after Alleyne. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson,
732 F.3d 577, 583-84 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming use of extraverdict drug quantity finding to select
sentence within statutory tier established by verdict facts).
51. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 (2000).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 491-97. In Apprendi, the defendant's conviction resulted from a guilty plea. See
id. at 469-70.
54. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-76 (2007).
55. See id. at 288-93.
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day" that the defendant had improperly stored toxic chemicals.5 6  The jury's
verdict did not specify the number of days for which the violation had occurred,
and the sentencing judge determined that $18 million in penalties, out of a
possible $38 million, should be imposed for a 762-day violation. 7 Because each
additional day increased the maximum punishment available, the Court
concluded that the length of the defendant's violation must be established as a
verdict fact to comply with the Apprendi rule.58
Thus, when faced with a compound offense-defining statute with several
penalties available, the Court adopted an interpretive solution that such statutes
must, for constitutional purposes, define multiple crimes. That is, when a statute
defines multiple punishments which are linked to findings of specific facts, those
layers of punishment create separate offenses, and their triggering facts must be
treated as offense elements.
B. Constructive Offense Elements: Mandatory Sentencing Effects
Another facet of the contemporary U.S. criminal justice system is the
product of the sentencing reform movement: provisions which seek to constrain
the decision-making of sentencing judges in service of inter-judge consistency,
systemic uniformity, and similar values.59 Rather than appearing as part of the
criminal code which defines offenses, however, such regulations of sentencing
authority often are placed in entirely separate bodies of law and expressly purport
to not be defining new crimes or offense elements. Nonetheless, their impact on
the sentence may still be mandatory in the sense that failure to comply with the
designated effect on the sentence constitutes reversible error. Though the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines may be the most prominent example, numerous variations
on the same idea are found among the states.60
Initially, the Court accepted these provisions on their face purely as rules
regulating sentencing authority which did not require constitutional treatment as
offense elements. In 1986, McMillan v. Pennsylvania upheld a state statute
requiring a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for visible possession of a
firearm during a qualifying felony based on a finding by a preponderance of the
evidence by the sentencing judge.6' The Court made short shrift of the
constitutional challenge.62 Likewise, for years, the lower federal courts
consistently rejected constitutional challenges to the Federal Sentencing
56. S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2349 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)
(2012)).
57. See id.
58. See id. at 2349-52.
59. See generally supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd, Blakely's Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 537-43 (2007) (discussing "the purpose and history
of state sentencing guidelines").
61. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81-82 & n.l (1986).
62. See id. at 84-93. The Court addressed only the Due Process Clause, see id., but not the
Sixth Amendment right which later arose in the Apprendi line of cases.
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Guidelines, which also relied upon factfinding by a preponderance of the
evidence.63
Once the Apprendi rule acknowledged the constitutional implications of
compound offense-defining statutes, however, the likely consequences for
mandatory sentencing regulations were apparent.6 Rejecting the arguments from
the dissenting Justices and some scholars and commentators, 6 5 the Court majority
expanded Apprendi and concluded that any provision of law, statutory or
otherwise, which links a mandatory increase in the maximum punishment to the
finding of a particular fact is tantamount to creating an aggravated offense such
that the triggering fact must be treated as an offense element for that enhanced
sentence to be constitutionally valid.66 In Blakely, the sentence would have been
no more than 53 months based on the verdict facts, but the defendant received 90
months based on the extraverdict facts found by the judge.67  In Booker, a
sentence based on the verdict facts would have produced an available range of
210 to 262 months, but the judge imposed 360 months based on additional facts
found at sentencing.68 To the extent the Washington state sentencing provisions
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, respectively, provided for judicial
determination by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing, they were
unconstitutional.9 Subsequently, in Alleyne, the Court overruled McMillan and
confirmed that facts linked to mandatory minimum sentencing provisions must
be established as verdict facts.70 As the Court restated the Apprendi-Alleyne rule,
"Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an 'element' that must
be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt."7'
Thus, when addressing provisions with mandatory effect on the imposition
of a sentence, a majority of the Court has declined to recognize a distinction
between statutes defining offenses and rules regulating sentencing with different
applicable procedural standards. Whether it is contained in a statute, sentencing
63. See, e.g., United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 543 U.S. 1101 (2005); United States v. Sales, 25 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 1994),
abrogated by United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 932-933 (8th Cir. 2000).
64. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 6-7 (explaining the distinction between
offense-defining and sentencing-regulating statutes).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 326 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 328 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Priester,
Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 902-09, 928-34 (advocating for retaining the Harris rule
within the Apprendi doctrine); Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 269-70 (urging
overturning of the Blakely-Booker expansion to the Apprendi rule); Priester, Bizarro World, supra
note 6, at 75-78 (same).
66. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-300. See also Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27, 231-35.
67. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298-300.
68. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 235.
69. See id. at 231-35, 243-44; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304.
70. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013). The Justices acknowledged
that both Harris and McMillan were being overruled. See id. at 2155, 2157-58 (opinion of the
Court by Thomas, J.); id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2172 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2155 (emphasis added). "Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a
crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that
must be submitted to the jury." Id.
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guideline, or other source or whether it is promulgated by the legislature or a
sentencing commission, any such provision of law must be treated for
constitutional purposes as creating offense elements.
C. Permissible Sentencing Factfinding: Judicial Discretion
On the other hand, throughout the Apprendi line of cases, the Court has
consistently emphasized that its doctrines do not foretell the abolition of
sentencing factfinding. Repeatedly, the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions have reaffirmed that the Constitution does not entirely forbid judges
from making findings of fact, separate and apart from proving the elements of the
offense of conviction, as part of the process for determining the appropriate
sentence to be imposed upon an individual offender.72 Rather, the Apprendi line
of cases has sought to place some outer limits upon certain types of factfinding
which are tantamount to sentencing the defendant for an aggravated offense for
which he or she was not convicted, while reserving plenty of opportunity for
extraverdict sentencing factfinding which does not present that danger.
To date, the Court's cases have drawn the line between permissible and
impermissible sentencing factfinding based on the principle of judicial discretion
in sentencing. Extraverdict factfinding using a reduced burden of proof in the
exercise of judicial discretion is permissible; factfinding pursuant to any
provision of law with mandatory impact on the sentence must be conducted as
offense elements. In jurisdictions which had continued to rely upon judicial
discretion in sentencing or which had adopted sentencing guidelines of non-
mandatory character, this doctrinal line did not require any changes." In the
many jurisdictions with at least some mandatory regulations of sentencing
authority, however, the implementation of those rules had to change to avoid the
constitutional violation identified in Blakely and Booker. Most affected states
responded by shifting the implicated factfinding into offense elements.74 Others
followed the Court's solution for the Federal Sentencing Guidelines promulgated
in Booker, shifting formerly mandatory rules into advisory provisions to shape,
but not dispositively constrain, the exercise of sentencing discretion.
Legislatures and sentencing commissions retain the power to adopt and enforce
mandatory punishments, but they must be implemented through verdict facts
established as offense elements.
Thus, the Court retained a substantial role for sentencing factfinding in
determining offenders' punishments but insisted that extraverdict factfinding be
conducted by judges in the exercise of discretion. Repudiating one of the key
72. See, e.g., id. at 2163 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) and
Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010)); id. at 2169-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(same); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 519-20 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 524-27 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); id. at 561-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-Blakely Era,
17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233 (2005).
74. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 19-20 & nn.73-75.
75. See id. at 20 & nn.76-78.
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objectives of the sentencing reform movement, the Court compelled a system of
discretionary jud ment and individualized punishment as a matter of
constitutional law.
D. Additional Constructive Offense Elements? Will the Line Hold?
Given the instability in the span of Apprendi cases to date, it is no surprise
that the Court's opinions include indications that the currently existing doctrinal
line may not be the final word on the boundary between constructive offense
elements and permissible extraverdict sentencing factfinding. For the same
reason, though, it is difficult to predict which, if any, of these additional
constructive offense elements might be enforced by a majority opinion of the
Court. If nothing else, the Court seems far from finished with its consideration of
the issues raised by the constitutional law of sentencing factfinding.
1. Facts Which Are Required by Substantive Appellate Review
The most prominent possibility for the Court to recognize another form of
constructive offense element is the doctrinal position advocated by Justice Scalia
for restricting the authority of appellate courts to substantively review sentences.
Initially developed in his concurring opinion in Rita,7 the argument is conveyed
with simple precision in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Joseph
Jones.7 8 Given the existence of the Apprendi rule and Booker-Rita substantive
reasonableness review, he argued, "[i]t unavoidably follows that any fact
necessary to prevent a sentence from being substantively unreasonable-thereby
exposing the defendant to the longer sentence-is an element" that must be
established as a verdict fact. 79 Put differently, "the Sixth Amendment is violated
when courts impose sentences that, but for a judge-found fact, would be reversed
for substantive unreasonableness."8 0 Under the pre-Booker Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, the proof of particular facts specified in the Guidelines triggered
mandatory increases in a sentence; consequently, imposing enhanced sentences
81
without finding the necessary facts would be reversible error. In Justice
76. See id. at 47-54, 63-75; Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 252-70. Ongoing
discussions and debates about sound sentencing practices illustrate why it is problematic for the
Court to insist upon one vision of sentencing as a matter of constitutional law. See, e.g., Douglas
A. Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
PoL'Y 151 (2014); George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission,
the Guidelines, and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 517 (2014); Brandon L. Garrett,
Accuracy in Sentencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REv. 499 (2014); Wadie E. Said, Sentencing Terrorist
Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477 (2014).
77. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 13-16, 29-30 (discussing Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 362-84 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring)). See also Marlowe v. United States, 555 U.S.
963, 963 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
78. See Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8, 8-9 (2014).
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 8-9.
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Scalia's view, the operation of Booker-Rita reasonableness review is functionally
identical. 2 That is, reasonableness review also can link the finding of particular
facts to the validity of a sentence. If a sentence would be reversible error as
substantively unreasonable for being too severe, in the absence of factfinding to
justify its length, then that factfinding is, in a functional sense, equally
mandatory. Justice Scalia insisted upon "a fundamental difference, one
underpinning our entire Apprendi jurisprudence, between facts that must be
found in order for a sentence to be lawful, and facts that individual judges choose
to make relevant to the exercise of their discretion."83
The facts of Joseph Jones illustrate the problem: without the challenged
factfinding at sentencing, the three defendants would have faced 27 to 71 months
imprisonment; with those facts considered, they actually received 180 to 225
months.8 4 It seems quite unlikely that those dramatically longer sentences could
be sustained as substantively reasonable unless supported by the additional
factfinding.85  For that reason, Justice Scalia maintained that the Court should
have granted certiorari to vindicate the defendants' rights by requiring the facts
which were necessary to make the lengthier sentences ubstantively reasonable to
be proven as verdict facts.86
Despite Justice Scalia's longstanding influence in shaping the Apprendi
rule,87 so far only two other Justices have indicated potential support for this
view. Accordingly, it is difficult to predict whether this additional expansion of
82. The other solution to the constitutional problem would be for the Court to abolish Booker-
Rita reasonableness review and hold that "all sentences below the statutory maximum are
substantively reasonable." Id. at 9.
83. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 373 (2007).
84. Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 9.
85. See id. at 8. See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4-8, 15-16, Jones v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 8 (2014) (No. 13-10026). Citing United States Sentencing Commission data, the petition
for certiorari asserts that "Petitioners' sentences were four times higher than anyone has received in
the post-Booker era using the 2007-2010 Guidelines Manual" for the drug quantities established as
verdict facts in their case. Id. at 5.
86. Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 8.
87. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 14 & n.53, 29-30. It is possible Justice
Scalia's doctrinal influence in this area is waning. In addition to the dearth of support for his views
about substantive appellate review of sentences, his position that the Apprendi rule should only be
applied to increases to the maximum sentence, but not to increases in the mandatory minimum
sentence, only has the support of two other Justices, while Justice Thomas' position has the support
of four Justices. See infra Part IV.B.
88. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg joined Justice Scalia's opinion in Joseph Jones, see Jones v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 8, 8 (2014), though their votes to grant certiorari may have been premised
on the use of acquitted conduct to enhance the sentence in that case, rather than agreement with
Justice Scalia's critique of Booker-Rita reasonableness review specifically. Similarly, although
Justice Thomas initially joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Rita, he later adopted the
position that Booker-Rita reasonableness review must be completely abolished, see infra notes 215-
221 and accompanying text, so he may have joined the Joseph Jones opinion based on Justice
Scalia's indication that such an option is available. See supra note 8282. On the other hand,
although the dissenting opinion in Cunningham agreed with the proposition that at least some
sentences would be affirmed on appeal as substantively reasonable only due to the finding of one or
more facts, those three Justices reject the claim that any constitutional violation occurs in such a
situation. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 309 & n. 11 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Apprendi to constrain substantive appellate review of sentences is likely to gain
sufficient support to be adopted by a majority of the Court, particularly in light of
the loss of its principal advocate.
2. Facts Which Could Trigger an Increased Range
Another potential expansion of the Apprendi rule to create additional
constructive offense elements appears in intriguing dicta in Justice Thomas'
majority opinion in Alleyne. In the course of justifying the overruling of Harris
and extending the Apprendi rule to mandatory minimum sentencing provisions,89
the opinion states that a fact which appears in an offense-defining statute and is
linked to enhanced punishment must be an offense element in all cases, not just
those individual cases in which that fact is used to impose a lengthier sentence.9 0
That is, because the fact could increase the maximum or minimum sentence, it is
an offense element even if the actual sentence imposed was available without
that fact.91 Justice Thomas provides an example which clearly illustrates that this
is the interpretation of the Apprendi rule intended to be described in this passage
in Alleyne. 2
Yet, this position is distinctly not how the Court-or Justice Thomas-has
described or applied the Apprendi rule in its previous decisions. Consistently
throughout the prior cases, the Court has asserted that a constitutional violation
occurs only when extraverdict factfinding actually results in the imposition of an
Thus, it is not clear that any other Justice fully supports Justice Scalia's views on substantive
appellate review of sentences.
89. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160-63 (2013).
90. See id. at 2161-63. "The essential point is that the aggravating fact produced a higher
range, which, in turn, conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated
crime. It must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
2162-63.
91. Justice Thomas in Alleyne maintains that such a fact
constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury,
regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different range had been
applicable. Indeed, if a judge were to find a fact that increased the statutory maximum
sentence, such a finding would violate the Sixth Amendment, even if the defendant ultimately
received a sentence falling within the original sentencing range (i.e., the range applicable
without that aggravating fact).
Id. at 2162.
92. The opinion for the Court in Alleyne explained:
Many criminal statutes allow for this possibility. For example, an Illinois law provides for a
sentence of 2 to 10 years' imprisonment for intimidation ... and 3 to 14 years for aggravated
intimidation .... The elements of aggravated intimidation include all the elements of
intimidation plus one enumerated aggravating fact. Under this statute, if a jury found each
element of intimidation, but the judge purported to find a fact that elevated the offense to
aggravated intimidation, the Sixth Amendment would most certainly be violated, even if the
defendant received a sentence that fell within both ranges.
Id. at 2162 n.4 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/12-6(b) & 6.2(b) (Westlaw current through Public
Act 99-500 of the 2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.)).
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enhanced sentence not available based upon the verdict facts alone.93 The entire
premise of the remedial dissent in Booker, which Justice Thomas supported,94
was that Congress intended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be mandatory,
and, accordingly, the Court should have allowed them to remain as mandatory as
possible by invalidating their application only in those individual cases in which
the sentence imposed actually violates the Apprendi rule.95 In his separate
dissent in Booker, Justice Thomas specifically emphasized that one defendant's
sentence violated Apprendi while the other defendant's did not and argued that
severability analysis would support invalidating the Guidelines only to the extent
96they produced constitutional violations on the facts. As recently as Pepper, two
years prior to Alleyne, Justice Thomas dissented separately to reiterate his view
that "'makes the Guidelines mandatory,' unless doing so would actually violate
the Sixth Amendment."97
Consequently, it seems highly unlikely that Justice Thomas has
misunderstood or misremembered the longstanding understanding of the
Apprendi rule. Likewise, it seems unlikely that the other four Justices who
joined this part of his opinion for the Court could have missed the difference.9 8
What, then, explains this curious passage in Alleyne asserting such a dramatically
broader scope to the rule? Perhaps Justice Thomas has changed his mind about
the proper boundaries of the Apprendi rule, as he has done previously.99 Perhaps
further experience implementing the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Booker-Rita reasonableness review has convinced some of the Justices to revisit
93. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 278-79 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing an example of permissible extraverdict factfinding which could have, but did not in
fact, increase the sentence beyond the Guidelines maximum established by verdict facts).
94. See id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) ("I dissent from Justice Breyer's opinion for
the Court. While I agree with Justice Stevens' proposed remedy and much of his analysis, I
disagree with his restatement of severability principles and reliance on legislative history, and thus
write separately.").
95. See id. at 271-74, 278-80, 284-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 319-20, 321-22,
326 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
96. See id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) ("Application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines resulted in impermissible factfinding in Booker's case, but not in Fanfan's. Thus
Booker's sentence is unconstitutional, but Fanfan's is not."). See also id. at 319-20, 326.
97. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 518 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 116 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) and citing United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 313-26 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part); Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 61 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 717
(2008) (Thomas, J., concurring)). "I would apply the Guidelines as written in this case because
doing so would not violate the Sixth Amendment.... Because Pepper has admitted facts that would
support a much longer sentence than the 65 months he received, there is no Sixth Amendment
problem in this case." Id. at 519.
98. See Alleyne, 113 S. Ct. at 2153 (noting that Part Ill-B is the opinion of the Court). Justices
Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan joined this part of the opinion, id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring), as did Justice Breyer, id. at 2167 (Breyer, J., concurring).
99. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520-21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas initially joined the majority in Almendarez-Torres but then switched sides after
becoming persuaded by the originalist evidence. See id. See also Priester, Bizarro World, supra
note 6, at 31-32.
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the terms of the underlying Apprendi rule. Or perhaps something else is going
on. Until further cases have the opportunity to revisit the Apprendi rule, it will
be difficult to know what this passage in Alleyne portends.
3. Facts Which Are Inconsistent with the Jury Verdict
Since its inception, one of the principal rationales for the Apprendi rule has
been that a sentencing judge violates the Sixth Amendment by imposing a
punishment more severe than what was authorized by the facts established in the
jury's verdict.'00  Likewise, permissible sentencing factfinding involves the
determination of supplementary extraverdict facts for the purpose of selecting a
precise sentence within the available scope of penalties created by the jury's
verdict facts.'0 ' For example, the leader/organizer enhancement and minor
participant reduction in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reflect the
commonsensical moral judgment that individuals who played a major role in the
crime's planning and commission are more culpable and worthy of greater
punishment than the bit players, underlings, and tangential individuals involved
in the crime.102 With rare exceptions, though, the extent of a person's role as
leader or subordinate is not relevant to the offense elements of an offense of
conviction.103 Thus, the leader/organizer and minor participant provisions are
quintessential sentencing facts: they are relevant to determining punishment, but
they do not exceed the crime authorized by the jury's verdict or otherwise create
the risk of sentencing the defendant for an aggravated offense for which he was
not charged or convicted.
In some scenarios, however, the determination of additional sentencing
facts can be viewed as circumventing or contradicting the jury's verdict. One
commonly asserted example is drug quantity: the Government might charge and
prove at trial a relatively small quantity of drugs and then at sentencing seek a
finding of a vastly larger quantity of drugs to support a sentence toward the top
end of the available punishments.'04 Given the wide statutory ranges authorized
by many narcotics offenses, such a finding would not violate the Apprendi rule as
100. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Part IlI.C.
102. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 25, § 311.1-2.
103. For example, the offense elements of the crime of conspiracy do not distinguish among
significant and minor players in the group. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (default federal
conspiracy provision); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012) (federal narcotics conspiracy provision). On the
other hand, certain statutes require proof of a leadership role as an element of the offense. See 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012) (RICO), interpreted in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); 21
U.S.C. § 848(b)-(c) (2012) (continuing criminal enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a)-(c) (2012) (illegal
gambling business).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 732 F.3d 577, 579 (6th Cir. 2013) ("Johnson pleaded
guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or
more of cocaine base.... Johnson attacks the district court's determination that his relevant conduct
involved the distribution of nearly 4.5 kilograms of cocaine base as both clearly erroneous and a
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights." (internal citations omitted)).
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currently constituted.105  Another situation involves so-called "uncharged
conduct": matters which could have been charged and proven at trial but which
were not pursued by the Government until sentencing.0 6  For example, a
defendant might be charged and convicted of one bank robbery, but the
Government might seek to establish at sentencing three additional robberies
committed by the defendant.10 7 Again, so long as the ultimate sentence imposed
remains within the penalties authorized by the counts of conviction, the Apprendi
rule is not violated by increasing the sentence on the basis of uncharged
conduct.1os Naturally, many scholars, commentators, lawyers, and judges find
these sorts of practices to be objectionable.'0"
Most controversial is the situation presented in Joseph Jones: the use of
"acquitted conduct" to increase a defendant's sentence for the crimes for which
he was convicted."l0 In the pre-Booker era, the Court in United States v. Watts
upheld the consideration of acquitted conduct under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, reasoning that the differences in burden of proof-beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial, preponderance of the evidence at sentencing-did not
require a sentencing judge to ignore facts simply because the jury had acquitted
the defendant on some counts."' Even before Booker, this holding was
controversial and highly criticized.'12 After Booker, more interests than simply
the burden of proof are implicated in the analysis. In particular, the Apprendi
rule emphasizes the importance of the verdict facts as limits on the power to
105. See, e.g., id. at 584 ("Even aside from Johnson's concession with respect to a portion of the
drug quantities attributed to him, the district court's factual determination with respect to the
additional quantities did not violate his Sixth Amendment rights as articulated in Alleyne.").
106. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995) (uncharged cocaine crimes used as
relevant conduct to increase sentence for marijuana convictions); United States v. Jones, 635 F.3d
909 (7th Cir. 2011) (uncharged offense for possession of firearm with obliterated serial number
used as relevant conduct to increase sentence for narcotics and weapons convictions).
107. See United States v. Beasley, 322 F. App'x 777, 778-79 (1 Ith Cir. 2009).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Castellar, 455 F. App'x 191, 194-95 (3d Cir. 2011).
109. See, e.g., Kathryn M. Zainey, Comment, The Constitutional Infirmity of the Current
Federal Sentencing System: How the Use of Uncharged and Acquitted Conduct o Enhance a
Defendant's Sentence Violates Due Process, 56 Loy. L. REV. 375, 403-04 (2010); Erin A.
Higginbotham, A Meaningless Relationship: The Fifth Circuit's Use of Dismissed and Uncharged
Conduct Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 267, 298-99 (2008); Freya
Russell, Note, Limiting the Use of Acquitted and Uncharged Conduct at Sentencing: Apprendi v.
New Jersey and Its Effect on the Relevant Conduct Provision of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1199, 1227-28 (2001).
110. Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014).
111. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) ("We therefore hold that a jury's verdict
of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the
acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.").
112. See, e.g., Orhun Hakan Yalincak, Critical Analysis ofAcquitted Conduct Sentencing in the
U.S.: "Kajfka-Esque, " "Repugnant," "Uniquely Malevolent" and "Pernicious"?, 54 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 675, 680 (2014) (arguing that "use of acquitted conduct at sentencing should be prohibited
on both constitutional and normative grounds"); James J. Bilsborrow, Note, Sentencing Acquitted
Conduct to the Post-Booker Dustbin, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289, 293 (2007) (arguing that "the
principles espoused by the Court in Apprendi and its progeny, in addition to the constitutional
history relied upon in these cases, renders the consideration of acquitted conduct unconstitutional").
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punish, as well as the crucial role of the jury as factfinder in all non-petty cases
where a jury is required. For this reason, Justice Scalia took issue with the
Government's actions in Jones:
[N]ot only did no jury convict these defendants of the offense the sentencing judge
thought them guilty of, but a jury acquitted them of that offense. Petitioners were
convicted of distributing drugs, but acquitted of conspiring to distribute drugs. The
sentencing judge found that petitioners had engaged in the conspiracy of which the
jury acquitted them.113
The consequence of the inclusion of that acquitted conduct was that the
defendants were given sentences of 15 years or more in prison, rather than the 2
to 6 years they would have faced otherwise.14 Under the current Apprendi rule,
however, the verdict facts had established a statutory maximum sentence of 20
years or more for each defendant, so the extraverdict factfinding did not exceed
what the jury had authorized."5  Thus, Justice Scalia described Jones as a
"particularly appealing case" for expanding the Apprendi rule and declaring the
lengthened sentences to be unconstitutional. 16
Given the trajectory of the Apprendi line of cases to date and the values
underlying the origin of the rule, it would not be surprising if the Court were to
adopt an additional elaboration of the principle to address sentencing factfinding
which is inconsistent with the verdict facts established by the jury. The use of
acquitted conduct, in particular, conflicts with the core values of the Apprendi
doctrine. Prohibiting the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing also has the
advantage of a clear, bright line for courts to enforce. Other forms of
extraverdict factfinding would be more difficult to address, as the Court would
have to define when a sentencing extraverdict fact is impermissibly contradictory
to or inconsistent with the verdict facts and when it is permissible supplementary
factfinding. In light of continuing criticism of the Government's sentencing
practices, though, the Court might feel compelled to intervene.
IV. WHAT DO THE JUSTICES THINK THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES?
If the Court's analyses and results in the 15 years of Apprendi cases shaping
the constitutional law of sentencing factfinding seem incoherent, perhaps even
inexplicable, at least it is easy to identify the source of the problem. Undeniably,
the Justices hold a wide variation in views about the proper scope of the doctrinal
rules in this area, and they have not yet been able to reach an enduring stable
consensus about the correct approach to resolving these cases. Until the Justices
113. Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See id.
115. See Brief for the Appellee-United States in Opposition at 5 n.4, United States v. Jones, 744
F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 8 (2014) (No. 13-10026) (describing the statutory
maximum sentences of 20 years for Thurston, 30 years for Jones, and 40 years for Ball).
116. Jones, 135 S. Ct. at 9 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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themselves achieve greater synergy among their respective viewpoints, the cases
and doctrine are doomed to continued instability and unpredictability.
A. Increasing the Ceiling: The Apprendi Rule
With the Apprendi holding on the books for 15 years and its rule having
been applied by the Court in an array of subsequent cases over that span, outward
indications might suggest that its core principle is firmly entrenched. The reality,
though, is that it is far from certain that the Court will maintain its commitment
to the requirement that facts which increase a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum must be established as verdict facts. Although the rule appears to now
have more support than at its inception, its endurance is not guaranteed.
At its origin, the Apprendi rule was adopted by the slimmest of margins.
Justice Scalia's initial dissenting opinions proposing the rule garnered only four
votes.1 1 Justice Thomas was later convinced by originalist evidence to change
his vote, becoming a supporter of the rule." 8  Over the next five years, as the
Court's membership remained unchanged through Blakely and Booker, four
Justices consistently and strongly dissented from the application of the Apprendi
rule, urging for it to be overruled."'9 Moreover, because the opinions' lineups in
these cases did not divide along the traditionally perceived political allegiances
of the Justices, 120 it was entirely possible that any change in membership on the
Court could have replaced a supporter of the rule with an opponent.121
After four new Justices took their seats on the Court in subsequent years,
three Justices continued to oppose the existence of the Apprendi rule. 22 In both
Southern Union and Alleyne, their opinions did not simply reject the expansion of
the rule to amount-per-day fines and mandatory minimum punishments,
117. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 740 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 229 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 520-21 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
119. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 552-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 320-23
(2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 327-31 (2005) (Breyer,
J., dissenting in part).
120. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 872 n.56.
121. For example, Justice O'Connor was replaced by Justice Alito, who shares her opposition to
Apprendi, while Chief Justice Roberts has voted in support of Apprendi, unlike his predecessor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice Breyer was a Clinton appointee but opposes Apprendi, unlike the
other Clinton and Obama appointees. If it had been Justice Scalia rather than Justice O'Connor
replaced by Justice Alito or Justice Stevens replaced with a jurist sharing the views of Justice
Breyer rather than Justice Ginsburg, the votes would have existed to switch the majority rulings in
Apprendi cases.
122. They are Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549
U.S. 270, 295-97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344,




respectively, but rather continued to call for overturning Apprendi itself.1 23
Perhaps the rule is no longer at risk of a sudden abolition from a single new
Justice-or a change of mind like Justice Thomas'-but the continued vocal
advocacy for abrogating Apprendi indicates the doctrinal disagreement is likely
to be one in which the outvoted Justices refuse to accept the new status quo.12 4
Although the Justices in support of and in opposition to the Apprendi rule
have shifted, the underlying rationales of the two opposing camps have remained
essentially stable over the line of cases. In that sense, then, the disagreement is
not about describing the most persuasive reasoning in favor of the alternative
positions on Apprendi so much as a fundamental dispute about which of the
competing justifications is the appropriate constitutional law doctrine. On that
issue, the Court has reached something of an equilibrium.
The Justices opposing the Apprendi rule reject the basic premise that the
statute defining the offense of conviction must play a conclusive role in also
defining the outer limits of the sentence that may be imposed upon the
offender.2 5 Rather than ask whether the sentence imposed was authorized by the
particular statutory provision for which the defendant was charged and
convicted, these Justices look to whether any statutory authority permits the
sentence.126 Thus, the hate-crime enhancement in Apprendi, the Guidelines'
enhancements in Blakely, and the amount-per-day fine in Southern Union could
lawfully be imposed by the sentencing judge without a need to establish the
triggering criteria as verdict facts.12 7 So long as the sentence is authorized by law
in the general sense, these Justices would deem it permissible.
More precisely, these Justices disclaim any role for the Sixth Amendment
jury trial right in limiting the sentence that may be imposed; instead, they rely
solely upon principles of fundamental fairness required by the Due Process
Clause. 8 In the early Apprendi cases, this group of Justices was comprised of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer.'2  On the
current Court, Justices Kennedy and Breyer continue to hold this view of the
constitutional law of sentencing, along with Justice Alito.1 3 0 In relying upon the
123. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2357-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at
2166-67 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2172-73 (Alito, J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 858-912 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); id. at 912-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 944-79 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id
at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
125. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 228-30.
126. Id.
127. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 532-36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 321-23
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2359-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 228-30 & n.84; Priester, Structuring
Sentencing, supra note 4, at 872, 876.
129. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 552-54 (2000) (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 872 & nn.49 & 56.
130. See supra note 122. These Justices do not always agree on the rationale in every case,
however. See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2166 (Breyer, J., concurring) (opposing Apprendi but
voting to overrule Harris); id. at 2167-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia & Kennedy,
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Due Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment, these Justices do concede
that, in principle, the use of extraverdict factfinding at sentencing to impose an
extremely severe sentence for a minor offense would be fundamentally unfair.'31
For these Justices, though, none of the situations in the Apprendi line of cases has
presented anything close to such a scenario.
The Justices supporting the Apprendi rule find persuasive the necessity of a
direct relationship between the offense of conviction and limitations upon the
punishment that may be imposed on the offender. The verdict facts are not
merely a technical prerequisite for the imposition of criminal punishment, but
rather a dispositive determination about the severity of the individual's crime.132
To sentence an offender more harshly than is authorized by the offense of
conviction, these Justices reason, is the functional equivalent of convicting the
defendant of a more serious offense without following the procedural
requirements for establishing offense elements. 133
In the Apprendi line of cases, the majority opinions for the Court have
described the conceptual basis for the rule as deriving from the Sixth
Amendment.134 The votes in support of these holdings have come from an
unusual alignment of Justices.' From their originalist methodology of
constitutional interpretation, Justices Scalia and Thomas have subscribed to this
view based on their reading of historical case law.' 36 Chief Justice Roberts also
has supported the Apprendi rule since joining the Court.'3 7 In the early Apprendi
cases, Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg also voted in favor of the Apprendi
JJ.) (supporting Apprendi but voting to retain Harris); id. at 2172-73 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(opposing Apprendi and voting to retain Harris).
131. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 229 & n.84.
132. See, e.g., Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 10 (citing cases).
133. See, e.g., id.; Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 896-902.
134. 1 have criticized the Court's reliance on this constitutional basis for the Apprendi doctrine.
See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 47-54; Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at
224-26, 260-66; Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 891-909.
135. "Jones was the first 5-4 decision in which these five Justices formed the majority." The
Statistics, 113 HARv. L. REv. 400, 405 n.u (1999). The next Term, Apprendi was the only decision
of the Court in which Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg formed a five-to-four
majority. See The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REv. 390, 395 n.t (2000). In the following three Terms,
"those Justices did not vote together in any of the Court's sixty-two decisions that were decided
5-4." R. Craig Green, Apprendi's Limits, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1155, 1184 n.148 (2005) (citing The
Statistics, 117 HARV. L. REV. 480, 485 (2003); The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REv. 453, 458 (2002);
The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REv. 539, 544 (2001)).
136. See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158-60 (2013) (opinion of the Court
by Thomas, J.); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 499-523 (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
137. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 273 (2007); S. Union Co. v. United States,
132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348 (2012). See also Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2168-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(defending the Apprendi rule as to increases in statutory maximum sentences). It was the addition
of Chief Justice Roberts to the Court which shifted the majority in favor of the Apprendi rule from
five-to-four to six-to-three; each of the other three new Justices has been voting for the same
outcomes in the Apprendi line of cases as his or her respective predecessors on the Court.
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rule.'3 8  Since taking their seats, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have joined
Justice Ginsburg in supporting Apprendi holdings.'9 Thus, on the contemporary
Court, three members typically viewed as conservative and three Justices
traditionally described as liberal have united to form the coalition to maintain and
apply the Apprendi rule to limit the maximum sentence that may be imposed on
an offender.
Although the pattern of support and opposition to the Apprendi rule appears
to be stable on the current Court, the appointment of new Justices easily could
change this dynamic in a short period of time. If someone who supports
Apprendi replaces Justice Kennedy or Justice Breyer, the votes could solidify
into a decisive majority for the foreseeable future. On the other hand, if jurists
who share the views of Justices Alito or Breyer replace any combination of
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, the support for Apprendi could again
become slim or, perhaps, no longer even represent the majority on the Court.
Regardless of the identity of the next president and the Justices whom he or she
appoints to the Court, one safe prediction is that a potential nominee's view on
Apprendi is unlikely to play any significant role in the selection or confirmation
process. This is not to say that the constitutional law of sentencing is not a
tremendously important issue for thousands of criminal defendants in the United
States each year, but only that its political and jurisprudential salience is far
lower than many other issues the Court is called upon to decide.14 0
B. Increasing the Floor: Harris and Alleyne
Once the Court adopted the Apprendi rule with respect to factfinding that
increases the statutory maximum sentence, it would not have been surprising for
the same lineup of Justices to vote for and against adopting a corresponding
requirement for factfinding that increases the minimum authorized sentence as
well. At the time, many commentators expected such an outcome.141 When the
Court addressed mandatory minimum sentences in Harris, however, it issued a
splintered opinion with no rationale gaining majority support and surprisingly
declined to extend Apprendi to the sentencing floor as well as to the sentencing
138. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221-25 (2005); Priester, Canine
Metaphor, supra note 5, at 230-33; Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 872 & nn.49
& 56, 880 & n.102.
139. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348; Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155; id. at 2164 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinions for the Court in Pepper (oined by Justice
Ginsburg, with Justice Kagan recused) and Peugh (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan), which
also reflects a doctrinal viewpoint supporting Apprendi-Booker doctrine. See Pepper v. United
States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011); Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (2013).
140. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
141. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Olson, Comment, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums After Apprendi,
96 Nw. U. L. REv. 811, 814 (2002) ("This rationale should apply equally to mandatory minimum
sentencing statutes.
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ceiling.14 2 This result faced much criticism for the decade preceding the Court's
grant of certiorari in Alleyne.143 Despite the passage of time and the opportunity
for the Justices to revisit their perspectives,14 the Court again issued a splintered
opinion with no majority on the reasoning, although the Court did overrule
Harris and require that mandatory minimum sentences be imposed based on
verdict facts.14  In both cases, Justice Breyer cast the deciding vote, and the
outcome switched only because he changed his mind over the intervening
years.146 Although the Court has reached the doctrinal result most commentators
support,47 it is difficult to find stability or predictability in the Apprendi rule
when such analytical fragmentation occurs.
What caused the Court's struggle to reach consensus in the mandatory
minimum cases? On this issue, ordinarily like-minded colleagues in Apprendi
cases could not find common ground. In both Harris and Alleyne, key Justices
viewed the situation of mandatory minimums as meaningfully different from
other cases.
142. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S 545, 556-69 (2002); id. at 569-72 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 575-80 (Thomas, J, dissenting). See also id. at 583 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the fragmented nature of the Court's decision).
143. See, e.g., Kirk J. Henderson, Mandatory-Minimum Sentences and the Jury: Time Again to
Revisit Their Relationship, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 37, 56 (2007) ("The Court's most recent cases
have all but said that these types of sentencing facts must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court seems poised to apply this requirement to mandatory-minimum sentences.");
Amy Baron-Evans & Anne E. Blanchard, The Occasion to Overrule Harris, 18 FED. SENT'G REP.
255 (2006); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-land": Statutory
Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 382-83 (2002)
("Despite the Court's decision in Harris, this article argues that the principles underlying Apprendi
ultimately demand a broader application.").
144. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 17 n.67 (noting that Justice Breyer expressed
reservations about his vote in Harris during oral argument in a 2010 case).
145. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158-63; id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2166-67
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2169-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2172-73 (Alito, J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 2173 n.* (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the fragmented nature of
the Court's decision).
146. Compare Harris, 536 U.S. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring), with Alleyne v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2166-67 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
147. See, e.g., Ben Ashworth, Between a Rock and a Hard 50: The Effect of the Alleyne
Decision on Kansas' Sentencing Procedures, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 274-75 (2015);
Kevin Bennardo, Decoupling Federal Offense Guidelines from Statutory Limits on Sentencing, 78
Mo. L. REv. 683, 683-84 (2013); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising
Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 51 Hous. L. REv. 1227, 1268-70 (2014); Aimee
Tecla Canty, Student Work, A Return to Balance: Federal Sentencing Reform After the "Tough-on-
Crime" Era, 44 STETSON L. REv. 893, 897 (2015); Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman,
Sentencing's Wild Ride Continues, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 283 (2014); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F.
Andrew Hessick, Procedural Rights at Sentencing, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 187, 188 (2014); Note,
Sixth Amendment-Right to Jury Trial-Mandatory Minimum Sentences-Alleyne v. United States,
127 HARv. L. REV. 248 (2013). By contrast, I have argued that the Apprendi-Harris rule is the
correct constitutional interpretation. See Priester, Structuring Sentencing, supra note 4, at 902-09,




The outcome in Harris occurred because Justice Scalia defected from the
Apprendi majority and refused to extend the rule to mandatory minimum
sentences. The other four Justices in the Apprendi majority dissented-Justice
Thomas wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg-to
advocate that mandatory minimums also must be established as verdict facts.14 8
Likewise, the four Justices who had dissented in Apprendi as to maximum
sentences naturally opposed the rule's application to minimum sentences. Justice
Kennedy wrote a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor;14 9 Justice Breyer concurred separately to note that he agreed with
Justice Thomas' analysis that applying Apprendi to both maximum and minimum
sentences was a more intellectually consistent rule, but since he opposed
Apprendi in the first instance, he would not vote to extend the rule. 50 It was
Justice Scalia's vote that made a difference: without comment, he joined Justice
Kennedy's opinion refusing to extend Apprendi to mandatory minimums, rather
than Justice Thomas' opinion urging the rule's application to both the ceiling and
the floor.15 '
A decade later, the result in Alleyne occurred because Justice Breyer was no
longer willing to continue opposing Apprendi and, instead, agreed to concede to
its implementation. This time, as the opinion of the Court overruling Harris and
extending Apprendi to mandatory minimums, Justice Thomas again wrote for the
group of four Justices who support Apprendi, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan.15 2 In dissent, four Justices voted to retain Harris. Chief
Justice Roberts, who generally has voted in agreement with Justice Scalia in
Apprendi cases,'53 wrote the lead dissent joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
asserting the principal arguments for not extending Apprendi.15 4 Justice Alito
dissented separately, urging that Apprendi be overruled. 55 In Alleyne, Justice
Breyer's vote was dispositive: he again concurred separately to explain that,
although he continues to disagree with Apprendi on the merits, its persistence
over his opposition justifies his concession to permit a doctrinally consistent rule
to be enforced.'56  Consequently, the opinion overruling Harris and applying
Apprendi to mandatory minimums garnered five votes in Alleyne.
The sources of some of these divergences among the Justices are easy to
identify, while others are more elusive. What makes the disagreements
especially interesting is that they have arisen between Justices who ordinarily
align in Apprendi cases. Perhaps most intriguing is the split between the Court's
two prominent originalists over the interpretation of the historical evidence.
Justice Scalia began the Apprendi line of cases with originalist arguments, and
148. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 572-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 549-69.
150. See id. at 569-72 (Breyer, J., concurring).
151. See id. at 549. See also Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 233-34.
152. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156-64; id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
153. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 31-35.
154. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2169-72 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 2172-73 (Alito, J., dissenting).
156. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2166-67 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas joined the Apprendi majority after becoming persuaded by his
examination of the historical record.157 On the issue of mandatory minimum
sentences, however, they have parted ways. Justice Thomas' lead dissent in
Harris provided an extensive discussion of his originalist argument for requiring
that increases to the sentencing floor be established as verdict facts, which he
revisited in the majority opinion in Alleyne.58 Justice Scalia did not join either
of those opinions. Nor did he write an opinion in either case to explain his views,
although he joined opinions authored by Justice Kennedy in Harris and Chief
Justice Roberts in Alleyne which asserted that the historical evidence did not
support extending Apprendi to minimum sentences.159
Interestingly, both perspectives on the originalist analysis agree that facts
which are "essential" to the punishment imposed must be established as verdict
facts.160  Under the interpretation adopted by Justice Scalia, only the facts
creating the maximum punishment qualify as essential-because defendants have
no constitutional entitlement to mercy, any sentence up to and including the
maximum punishment is inherently authorized by the verdict facts.16 1 It follows
that any facts found which produce a higher minimum sentence, whether in the
exercise of judicial discretion or pursuant to mandatory minimum provisions,
may be determined as extraverdict facts because they are supplementary to the
determination of the particular sentence, not essential to authorize its
imposition.'6 2 On the other hand, Justice Thomas has maintained that facts which
trigger mandatory minimums are essential to the sentence because they divest the
sentencing judge of authority to impose a punishment that otherwise would have
been available. 63 That is, just as the statutory maximum prohibits a sentencing
judge from imposing punishment more severe than that ceiling, so too a
157. See supra note 99.
158. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S 545, 572-83 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Alleyne,
133 S. Ct. at 2158-63.
159. See Harris, 536 U.S. at 556-68 (plurality opinion of the Court by Kennedy, J.); Alleyne,
133 S. Ct. at 2169-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Harris plurality opinion, written by Justice
Kennedy, relies upon originalist arguments advanced by Justice Scalia. See Priester, Canine
Metaphor, supra note 5, at 233-34 & nn. 10-14. Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion in
Alleyne likewise makes extensive reference to arguments previously advanced by Justice Scalia,
particularly his concurring opinion in Apprendi. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2168-72.
160. See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2159, 2161; id. at 2168 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); S. Union
Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2354-55 (2012); Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,
291 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-04, 313 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 510-15 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). The term comes from the nineteenth-
century criminal procedure treatise by Bishop, see I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872), which is frequently quoted and cited in
these opinions. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 510-12 (Thomas, J., concurring) (extensively discussing
the Bishop treatise).
161. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 233-34. See also, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Priester, Structuring
Sentencing, supra note 4, at 902-09.
163. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158-66; Harris, 536 U.S. at 572-83 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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mandatory minimum bars the judge from sentencing the offender to a more
lenient punishment than that raised floor. '
The future of the originalist contribution to the doctrine is unclear. With
support from three other Justices for his view, Justice Thomas has no reason to
change his approach to applying Apprendi to mandatory minimums. Although
Justice Scalia initially disagreed alone, in Alleyne Chief Justice Roberts also
supported the differentiation between facts which increase the maximum and
those which raise the minimum. In the absence of Justice Scalia's forceful
advocacy for his interpretation of the historical record, however, the Chief Justice
may not be as inclined to persist in the divergence. Ironically, this dispute
between the advocates for the Apprendi rule leaves the Harris-Alleyne
controversy to be decided by the votes of the Justices who opposed Apprendi in
the first place.
The three current Justices opposing the underlying Apprendi rule also could
not find any consensus on how to approach the analysis in Alleyne. All three are
clearly on record as agreeing that Apprendi was wrongly decided,"65 but only
Justice Alito and Justice Breyer were willing to say so in Alleyne, and they
reached opposite outcomes in doing so.'66 Justice Alito asserted his opposition to
Apprendi in dissent, uring that it should have been Apprendi, rather than Harris,
which was overruled. Justice Breyer began his concurring opinion by
reiterating his longstanding disagreement with the Apprendi rule, but he
concluded nonetheless that "the time has come to end this anomaly in A 1prendi's
application" and extend the rule to minimums as well as maximums.6 Justice
Kennedy did not write separately in Alleyne. Instead of joining either opinion by
the Justices with whom he usually agrees in Apprendi cases, 0 he joined Chief
Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, which defended Apprendi but rejected its
expansion to mandatory minimums."'
The explanation for the unusual alignment by Justice Kennedy is not readily
apparent from the opinions in Alleyne. Based on his previous track record in
Apprendi cases, Justice Kennedy seemingly would have been inclined to join
Justice Alito's dissenting opinion.1 7 2 Perhaps he did not wish to endorse its
164. See, e.g., Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2162 ("Elevating the low-end of a sentencing range
heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime .... ").
165. See supra notes 122 & 130 and accompanying text.
166. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2166-67 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); id.
at 2172-73 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2173 n.* (Alito, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 2166 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 2167 (Breyer, J., concurring).
170. In fact, Alleyne marks the first time that Justice Kennedy had diverged from Justice Breyer
regarding the outcome of a decision in the 15 years of the Apprendi line of cases from 1998-2013.
See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 31-35.
171. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2167 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
172. For example, he called for overruling Apprendi and Booker as recently as 2007 in
Cunningham. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295-97 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). He also joined the Southern Union dissent, which is based in part on the rationales of
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engagement with the originalism analysis or its discussion of stare decisis or the
overt call to consider overruling Apprendi.'73  Another possibility is that, like
Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy recognizes that Apprendi has become
sufficiently entrenched in the Court's case law to justify addressing its
application head on. Unlike Justice Breyer's concession to its extension, though,
Justice Kennedy's joining of Chief Justice Roberts' dissent is a vote consistent
with the goal of keeping the existing Apprendi rule as narrow as possible going
forward.
Likewise, Justice Breyer's alignment in Alleyne also marks a confusing turn
of events. Had he voted in favor of the doctrinal rule with which he personally
agrees, he would have provided the fifth vote to keep mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions available through extraverdict factfinding by sentencing
judges. Moreover, such a vote would have involved maintaining consistency
with precedent, rather than overruling it. If Justice Breyer had joined an opinion
retaining Harris and excluding mandatory minimums from Apprendi's scope,
that would have been an unremarkable action. Yet, Justice Breyer voted in
support of the majority in Alleyne, an unusual decision in both respects. Often
when Justices vote against their personal doctrinal viewpoints, it is because they
feel bound by stare decisis to do so, but here, Justice Breyer voted against his
own perspective to accomplish the overruling of Harris, a prior holding with
which he agreed. Conversely, Justices usually assert that a precedent is wrongly
decided to justify overruling it, but here, Justice Breyer voted to provide
consistency to the application of the Apprendi rule, a prior ruling from which he
dissented. His choice to align with the majority in Alleyne leaves both his own
views and the substance of Apprendi doctrine very much in limbo.' 7 4
prior dissents in the Apprendi line of cases. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344,
2357-59 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
173. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2172-73 & n.* (Alito, J., dissenting).
174. Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Alleyne does not mention or analyze stare decisis
doctrine. The opinion of the Court and the principal dissent both only off-handedly address stare
decisis. See id. at 2163 n.5; id. at 2172 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor's concurring
opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, argues that stare decisis principles favor
overruling Harris, directly responding to the criticisms levied by Justice Alito's separate dissent.
See id. at 2164-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 2172-73 & n.* (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice
Alito argues:
[O]ther than the fact that there are currently five Justices willing to vote to overrule Harris,
and not five Justices willing to overrule Apprendi, there is no compelling reason why the
Court overrules the former rather than the latter. If the opportunity arises in the future to
overrule Apprendi or the present case ... the precedent the Court sets today will be relevant to
the issue of stare decisis.
Id. at 2173 n.* (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito raised similar concerns in another recent
criminal procedure case. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348-51 (2009) (arguing that stare
decisis principles supported overruling New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), as to the
authorized scope of a warrantless search incident to arrest of the passenger compartment of an
automobile); id. at 358-64 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that stare decisis principles favored
retaining Belton). For a thoughtful analysis of stare decisis principles using the opinions in Alleyne
as an example, see Steven J. Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in
Constitutional Adjudication, 35 CARDOZO L. REv. 1687 (2014). See also L.A. Powe, Jr.,
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Given all of this fragmentation among the Justice's views, it is difficult to
assess the likely future for the Alleyne holding.'"5 Perhaps the one clear
indication is the four firm votes in favor of applying Apprendi to both the ceiling
and floor of the authorized sentence. But four votes are not enough for a holding,
and the tenuous support for Alleyne's outcome came from an unreliable vote in
favor at best. Although it would be unusual for the Court to overrule Alleyne on
the heels of having overruled Harris, the entire Apprendi line of cases has
featured unpredictable alliances and outcomes.176 Even more so than with the
Apprendi rule, the views of the next several Justices appointed to the Court may
very well decide the long-term prognosis for Alleyne's holding.
C. Advisory Federal Guidelines: Booker-Rita Reasonableness Review
Inextricably connected to the Court's struggles with the scope of the
Apprendi rule is the equally vexing issue of the appropriate remedy for a
sentencing scheme which violates the rule. At the basic level, an Apprendi
problem could be solved either by requiring the pertinent facts to be established
as verdict facts rather than extraverdict facts, thus curing the constitutional defect
in its mandatory application, or by eliminating the mandatory impact of the
implicated factfinding, thereby avoiding the applicability of the constitutional
rule in the first instance.77 Among the states, with their multitude of sentencing
schemes, each jurisdiction's courts and legislature could choose which path to
follow to conform to Apprendi and Blakely.'17  In the federal system, with the
predominant shadow of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines over the sentencing
landscape, the Court continues to grapple with the consequences of its merits
holding in Booker with no assistance from Congress, which has yet to respond to
Booker in any meaningful way. 79
Intragenerational Constitutional Overruling, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2093, 2117 & n.230, 2122 &
n.261 (2014) (noting the rarity of a Justice's change of mind, resulting in overruling a recent
decision, as occurred with Justice Breyer's votes in Harris and Alleyne).
175. The implications for the expansion of Alleyne's holding to other types of sentencing
factfinding are being discussed in the scholarly literature. See, e.g., Brynn Applebaum, Note,
Criminal Asset Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment After Southern Union and Alleyne: State-Level
Ramifications, 68 VAND. L. REV. 549, 563-65 (2015); James Barta, Note, Guarding the Rights of
the Accused and Accuser: The Jury's Role in Awarding Criminal Restitution Under the Sixth
Amendment, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 463-64 (2014); Richard E. Finneran & Steven K. Luther,
Criminal Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment: The Role of the Jury at Common Law, 35 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1, 17-19 (2013); Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground:
Factfinding that Limits Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 287, 286
(2014); Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and Sixth
Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 570 (2015).
176. See Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 31-34.
177. See, e.g., Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 248-49. See also Priester, Bizarro
World, supra note 6, at 19-20.
178. See Priester, Canine Metaphor, supra note 5, at 248-49 & nn.179-180 (citing sources
describing states' responses to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)).
179. See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Non-Redelegation Doctrine,
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 215-16 (2013) ("Indeed, the Booker Court specifically invited
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The roots of the ongoing discord emerge from the decision in Booker itself.
When the narrow Apprendi majority applied Blakely to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines,o80 the Court then had to determine what remedy to implement.
Fundamentally, the issue was one of severability: could the unconstitutional
portions of the statutory scheme be severed, such that the remaining provisions
could continue to function, or would the entire edifice have to fall because some
of its bricks had to be removed? Led by Justice Breyer, the four merits dissenters
urged a remedy which would preserve judicial extraverdict factfinding by the
sentencing judge, as well as appellate review of the substantive justification for
the sentence imposed, by rendering the Guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory.' 8 ' Justice Ginsburg declined to join the remedial analysis of her
fellow Justices in the merits majority, instead joining Justice Breyer's opinion
and providing the fifth vote necessary to make it the remedial majority.' 82 Justice
Stevens wrote the principal remedial dissent, arguing that the Guidelines should
remain mandatory through the use of extraverdict factfinding in all instances
except when use of verdict facts is necessary to avoid an Apprendi violation.'83
Subsequent cases developed the core principles of Booker-Rita
reasonableness review. The Booker remedial majority only sketched out the
basic notions that the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory and that
appellate courts should review sentences for reasonableness.'84 In Rita, the Court
elaborated the framework that should be followed: the District Court first
calculates the Guidelines sentence, then applies the statutory § 3553(a) factors,
and determines the final sentence; the Court of Appeals must ensure no
procedural error occurred, then substantively reviews the sentence for abuse of
discretion.'85 The Court applied this framework in Gall, Kimbrough, and Pepper,
further clarifying its interpretation by emphasizing the authority of sentencing
judges to reject sentences advised by the Guidelines. Gall repudiated the claim
that larger variances from the Guidelines' advice necessarily require
commensurately proportional differences from typical cases,'8 6 while Kimbrough
and Pepper authorized sentencing judges to reject sentencing policies contained
in the Guidelines-the crack/cocaine ratio and the prohibition on consideration of
Congress to take action to remedy federal sentencing. Congress has held multiple hearings on the
matter, but has taken no action to date.").
180. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005); id. at 226 (opinion of the Court by
Stevens, J.); id. at 326 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
181. See id. at 244-45, 258-65 (opinion of the Court by Breyer, J.).
182. See id. at 225, 244 n.*.
183. See id. at 271-74, 278-80, 284-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Thomas
dissented separately based on his view of severability analysis, but he agreed that the remedy
should be to maintain the existence of mandatory Guidelines except when Apprendi violations
occur on the facts. See id. at 319-20, 322-23, 326 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
184. See id. at 258-65 (opinion of the Court by Breyer, J.).
185. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342-51 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
49-52 (2007). See also Priester, Bizarro World, supra note 6, at 22-28.
186. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41-52.
442 [Vol. 47
SENTENCING FACTFINDING
post-sentencing rehabilitation, respectively.18 7  In Peugh, the Court
acknowledged that although the Guidelines are advisory for purposes of avoiding
Apprendi violations, they still play an important role in setting the context in
which a sentence is calculated and determined.'8 8  When Guidelines sentences
increase during the process of iterative amendments to its Jrovisions, this role is
significant enough to implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause.'8
A somewhat stable majority appears to have emerged to sustain this vision
of Booker-Rita reasonableness review. Justice Ginsburg has supported it since its
inception, and she wrote the opinion of the Court in Kimbrough.190  Justice
Kennedy also has joined every majority opinion in these cases. 191 Chief Justice
Roberts joined the Court after Booker and has voted with the reasonableness
review majority in every case but one.192 Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinions
for the Court in Pep er and Peugh, clearly indicating her views on
reasonableness review.' Justice Kagan's position on reasonableness review is
less defined, having been recused from Pepper and joining the majority opinion
in Peugh.194  She also joined the majority opinions in Southern Union and
Alleyne,19 5 which reflects consistent agreement with Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor on Apprendi issues.19 6 Thus, it seems likely that these five Justices
fully support Booker-Rita reasonableness review as developed through the
Court's decisions.
Justice Breyer was the initial architect of Booker-Rita reasonableness
review, writing the opinions for the Court in both cases,19 7 but his perspective has
been partially superseded by the views of the other Justices. Although agreeing
187. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94-110 (2007); Pepper v. United States, 562
U.S. 476, 480-505 (2011).
188. Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079-84 (2013).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 2077; Pepper, 562 U.S. at 479; Rita, 551 U.S. at 340; Gall, 552 U.S. at 41;
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90.
191. See Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2077; Pepper, 562 U.S. at 479; Rita, 551 U.S. at 340; Gall, 552
U.S. at 41; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 90. See also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225, 244
n.* (2005) (joining Justice Breyer's remedial majority opinion).
192. Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Thomas' dissent in Peugh, which focused on an
extensive critique of the Court's Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence based on an originalist
interpretation of its meaning. See Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2088-95 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by
Roberts, C.J., in full and by Scalia & Alito, JJ., in part). Compare id. at 2095 (Alito, J., dissenting,
joined by Scalia, J.) (disagreeing with the majority under existing doctrinal test exclusively).
Accordingly, it seems likely that his vote in Peugh was based on the Ex Post Facto Clause issue,
rather than substantial disagreement over the application of Booker-Rita reasonableness review in
other doctrinal contexts.
193. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 479; Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2077.
194. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 479; Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2077.
195. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348 (2012); Alleyne v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154-55 (2013). Justice Kagan also joined Justice Sotomayor's concurring
opinion in Alleyne. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2164.
196. See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2348; Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2154-55. Justice Kagan also
joined Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion in Alleyne. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2164.
197. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 225, 244; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 340 (2007).
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with the outcome on the facts of the defendant's case,19 8 he wrote separately in
Pepper to explain his concerns with the majority's approach to reasonableness
review.99 Justice Breyer maintained that judges should disregard the Guidelines
only if it is reasonable to do so and that Booker's holding does not " ive a
sentencing judge carte blanche" to sentence however he or she likes. He
emphasized that individualized sentencing is not the only tradition in U.S.
criminal justice and that pursuit of greater systemic uniformity in sentencing is
also an important objective.201 Consequently, he urged an interpretation of
Kimbrough which would cabin the manner in which judges can ignore the
Guidelines or the Sentencing Commission's policies.20 2 Thus, although he has
supported the outcomes in each of the Court's Booker-Rita doctrine cases, Justice
Breyer believes that reasonableness review should be interpreted to give the
Guidelines more influence upon sentences.203
Justice Alito would go even further in permitting the Guidelines to remain
highly influential in the determination of sentences. He believes Booker permits
the Guidelines to be given "significant weight" in the sentencing process. For
that reason, he dissented in Gall, Kimbrough, and Pepper because he did not find
sufficient justification for rejecting the sentencing recommendation of the
Guidelines in those cases.205 Currently, however, Justice Alito remains the only
justice who believes such an approach to sentencing under the Guidelines is
consistent with the remedy adopted in response to the merits holding of
Booker.206
On the other hand, Justice Scalia was critical of the appellate review
component of the Booker-Rita doctrine, raising doubts about whether it complies
with the requirements of the Apprendi rule. He joined Justice Stevens' remedial
dissent in Booker and also wrote separately to address the issue of appellate
review.207 "Until today," he emphasized, "appellate review of sentencing
discretion has been limited to instances prescribed by statute. Before the
Guidelines, federal appellate courts had little experience reviewing sentences for
anything but legal error."20 8  Justice Scalia strongly rejected the remedial
majority's argument that appellate review of sentences for reasonableness could
be justified through severability and statutory interpretation and expressed
198. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 508 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 508, 512 (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. See id. at 510 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202. See id. at 513-15 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. See id.
204. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 61-73 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 116 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting); Pepper, 542 U.S. at 516-18 (Alito, J.,
dissenting in part).
205. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 61-73 (Alito, J., dissenting); Kinibrough, 552 U.S. at 116 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Pepper, 542 U.S. at 516-18 (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
206. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 61-73 (Alito, J., dissenting); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 116 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); Pepper, 542 U.S. at 516-18 (Alito, J., dissenting in part).
207. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303-13 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
208. Id. at 307 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
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apprehensiveness that the practical implementation of reasonableness review
would fail to actually treat the Guidelines as advisory.20 9 In Rita, his concurring
opinion raised the constitutional concern described above-that to the extent the
finding of particular facts is necessary to make a sentence substantively
reasonable and avoid appellate reversal, those facts must be offense elements
under the A prendi rule '0-which he reiterated in concurrences in Gall and
Kimbroufh. Although as-applied challenges are one solution to this
problem, Justice Scalia's preferred approach was to abolish substantive
appellate review of the sentences imposed by trial court judges.2 13 In his opinion
in Joseph Jones, he reiterated this conclusion, insisting that the Court must either
recognize as-applied challenges to sentences which violate Apprendi due to
extraverdict factfinding necessary to their imposition or "eliminate the Sixth
Amendment difficulty by acknowledging that all sentences below the statutory
maximum are substantively reasonable."2 4
Finally, Justice Thomas also objects to the Court's implementation of
Booker-Rita reasonableness review. Like Justice Scalia, he agreed with the
proposed result urged by Justice Stevens' remedial dissent in Booker while
writing separately as well.215 Justice Thomas provided an alternative analysis of
the severability principles needed to resolve the remedial issue in Booker,2 16
reaching the same conclusion: "the unconstitutional application of the scheme in
Booker's case is severable from the constitutional applications of the same
scheme to other defendants," such that the Guidelines may be enforced as
mandatory in all cases in which they do not violate the Apprendi rule.2 17 He
initially joined Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Rita2 18 but quickly changed
his mind by the time of Gall and Kimbrough six months later.2 19 He asserted that
"there is no principled way to apply the Booker remedy-certainly not one based
on the statute. Accordingly, I think it best to apply the statute as written, ...
which makes the Guidelines mandatory" in cases like Kimbrough, where the
sentencing judge had varied from the Guidelines to impose a lower sentence than
209. Id. at 308-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
210. See supra Part Il.D.I.
211. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 368-84 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring); Gall, 552
U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., concurring); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 112-14 (Scalia, J., concurring).
212. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 375 ("The one comfort to be found in the Court's opinion ... is that it
does not rule out as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges to sentences that would not have been
upheld as reasonable on the facts encompassed by the jury verdict or guilty plea.").
213. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 370 ("1 would hold that reasonableness review cannot contain a
substantive component at all."). See also id. at 370-81 (explaining the reasons for this position); id.
at 381-84 (describing procedural review).
214. Jones v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 8, 9 (2014).
215. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
216. See id. at 314-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
217. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 326 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
218. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 367.
219. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 114 (2007) ("Although I joined Justice
Scalia's dissent in Rita accepting the Booker remedial opinion as a matter of 'statutory stare
decisis,' I am now convinced that there is no principled way to apply the Booker remedy .... ")
(internal citations omitted)). See also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 61 (2007).
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the Guidelines otherwise had provided.220 Justice Thomas reiterated this view in
Pepper, arguing that the Guidelines should be mandatory in all cases except
those in which an Apprendi violation would occur on the facts.22'
Just as with Apprendi and Alleyne, the enduring stability of the version of
Booker-Rita reasonableness adopted by a slim majority of the Justices is very
much an open question. The replacement of one or two Justices, a shift in the
views held by a Justice, or both holds the potential to deprive the current lineup
of their majority. Assuming the merits holding of Booker remains in place, even
subtle changes in the implementation of reasonableness review could make a
significant difference to the thousands of individuals sentenced each year in
federal court. For a subject so profoundly important to the fairness and
administration of the criminal justice system, the Court's lack of firm consensus
on the governing principles is deeply troubling.
V. CONCLUSION
Tens of thousands of convicted individuals are sentenced every year in the
United States. In nearly all of those cases, at least some amount of additional
factfinding occurs in the course of determining the punishment imposed for the
offense of conviction. In light of this crucial degree of importance to the
administration of the criminal justice system, it is remarkable that the Supreme
Court has been unable to achieve consistency, predictability, and doctrinal
coherence in the constitutional doctrines which limit sentencing judges' authority
to consider extraverdict facts beyond the offense elements established as verdict
facts. Given the dramatic breadth of the disagreements among the Justices on
these issues, however, the path to an enduring doctrinal solution is not readily
evident. Any attempt to bring coherence to its doctrines on the constitutional law
of sentencing factfinding will require the Court to decide additional cases, but
until something changes, that endeavor appears to be doomed for continued
failure.
Postscript-Mere weeks before this Article went to press, the sudden and
unexpected death of Justice Scalia on February 13, 2016, silenced the
predominant voice behind much of the Court's decision-making in these cases.
Whatever role his replacement may come to play in shaping the future of
doctrine, it is undeniably clear that Justice Scalia's impact on the constitutional
law of sentencing has been profound and memorable.
220. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 116. This view that the Booker remedy is fatally flawed is also
consistent with Justice Thomas joining Justice Scalia's opinion in Joseph Jones, which specifically
mentioned the option of abolishing Booker-Rita reasonableness review entirely. See Jones, 135 S.
Ct. at 9.
221. See Pepper v. United States, 542 U.S. 476, 518 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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